We now start to approach the Mind and Life perspective. We start by motivating a Biogenic, rather than Anthropocentric, perspective on cognition.
As an introduction, here is a chapter in Tony Chemero and Stephen Käufer’s forthcoming second edition of their introduction to phenomenology:
*Käufer, S. and Chemero, A. Enactivism and the Embodied Mind, Introduction to Phenomenology (2nd edition, 2021)
*Then I suggest turning to Marek McGann’s informal and brief introduction to the core concepts of enaction.
Then a rather more fleshed out introduction is provided here:
*Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). The Enactive Approach: Theoretical Sketches From Cell to Society. Pragmatics & Cognition, 19(1): 1-36
And here is one more article that covers a lot of ground, spanning the topics of this week and next:
*Cummins, F. and De Jesus, P. (2016) The loneliness of the enactive cell: towards a bio-enactive framework. Adaptive Behavior, 24(3), 149-159.
This article is one we have met before, but it remains relevant as we broach enaction more generally:
Barrett, L. (2015). Why Brains Are Not Computers, Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism, and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes. The Behavior Analyst, 1-15.
(This makes a similar point. Lyon, Pamela, and Fred Keijzer. “The human stain.” in Wallace, B., Ross, A., Davies, J. and Anderson, T. (eds) The Mind, the Body and the World: Psychology after Cognitivism (2007) Imprint Academic. 132-165.)