The term ‘enaction’ is used to pick out a few related, but rather distinct strands in contemporary cognitive science. Here, we address the sensorimotor correspondence theory of visual perception, sometimes misleadingly called a theory of enaction. Alva Noe has recently come to describe this approach as “Actionism”, which may help to settle the terminological confusion.
The core reading is this article. The article itself is long, but worth your while. It is followed by many rebuttals and discussion and a response. You don’t have to read all of those, as it is a lot of material, but it is worth skimming to see if anyone raised any objections that seem obvious to you.
*J. K. O’Regan, A. Noë. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001.
*McGann, M. (2010). Perceptual modalities: modes of presentation or modes of interaction?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17(1-2), 72-94.
*Please also watch the first 30 minutes of this talk by me. The later part of the talk will be relevant when we turn to the subject of joint speech, but the first part is relevant how we think of the senses in a strongy embodied framework.
The following articles add to that core reading, and are provided for your convenience:
Jesse Prinz provides a dissenting view in Putting the brakes on enactive perception, Psyche, 2006.
This seems like a good time to introduce Sensory substitution and the human-machine interface, by Paul Bach-y-Rita and Stephen Kercel (2003).